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Abstract 
 
A simple stylised model, that incorporates transaction costs, is developed. The Law of 
One Price (LOP) is assumed to hold with regard to a reference market that is not taken 
into account in the empirical testing of the Law. It is shown that under these 
assumptions the empirical tests of the LOP will fail. 
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Can the Law of One Price be tested? 
 
 
One of the simplest and most intuitive market efficiency arguments with regard to 
price dynamics is incorporated into the purchasing power parity (PPP) and the law of 
one price (LOP). In simple words they state that the price levels (in the PPP case) or 
individual product prices (in the LOP case) should move together. In this paper we 
will be concerned specifically with the LOP. This avoids some complications related 
to the aggregation problems that can arise in a PPP context as well as the presence of 
non-tradable goods. Additionally, the validity of the LOP is essentially a necessary 
requirement for the PPP to hold. 
Moreover, the LOP is such a fundamental and intuitive proposition that Lamont and 
Thaler (2003) define it as the ‘Second law of economics’. It is often implicitly or 
explicitly postulated in quantitative models. There is a huge literature concerned with 
testing both the LOP and the PPP. A simple formal test on the validity of the LOP 
will consist of simply testing the stationarity of the price differential tP∆  between two 
markets. If it is found to be stationary, the two prices are moving together in the long 
term, validating the LOP. If however the price differential contains unit root, this 
would reject the LOP. The above presents a strong version of the LOP. A somehow 
weaker version can be implemented by testing for stationarity the relative price. This 
weaker version allows for different preferences across the countries. 
Recently transaction costs have become the major explanations for the empirical 
rejection of the purchasing power parity and the law of one price. Following 
Heckscher (1916), some authors have considered the possibility of an inaction region 
(or “inaction band”) where the real exchange rate (RER) (or simply the price 
differential in the LOP case (or the relative price)) may behave like a random walk. 
The rationale for this is that in this case the price differential would be smaller than 
the transaction costs for trade. No arbitrage would then take place. Outside the 
inaction band defined by the transaction costs the excessive price differential would 
compensate these costs and the resulting trade (arbitrage) activities will bring the real 
exchange rate (price differential/relative price) back onto these bands (Obstfeld and 
Taylor, 1997; Bec et al., 2004). Microeconomic foundations for such behaviour are 
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laid down in the “iceberg” model presented in Sercu et al. (1995) or its simplified 
version due to by Bec et al. (2004).  
Note that although the above-described process is non-stationary in the inner inaction 
band, it is stationary in the outer bands and is thus globally stationary. 
Real markets however are often characterised by numerous imperfections. In 
particular, information asymmetries and barriers to entry can create segmented 
markets (Shiha and Chavas, 1995). With segmented markets the inner inaction band 
model may not hold. Furthermore segmented markets create conditions for price 
discriminations, which may lead to asymmetric adjustment process, such as for 
example stationary process if the price differential is positive (probably after taking 
into account the transaction costs band, but a non-stationary process when the price 
differential is positive. Additionally there may be cases, such as neighboring 
countries, or countries which are both net exporters (importers) sharing the same main 
destination (source) market, in which the inner inaction band may not exist. Another 
reason for via lotion of the LOP may be price discrimination. Alessandria and 
Kaboski (2004) found “evidence of systematic international price discrimination 
based on the local wage of consumers in the destination market”. Additionally 
institutional arrangements may cause the LOP to fail even in highly liquid financial 
markets (Lamont and Thaler, 2003). Barzel (2005) goes even further in arguing that 
the LOP would generally fail due to the unobservable informational content of the 
goods subject to the exchange. His informal theoretical model resembles closely the 
latent price process model introduced in Clark (1973). 
 
Even if unobservable informational content of the goods is not an issue, the 
transaction cost models assume direct trade between two reference markets. This is 
obviously a very restrictive assumption. One can imagine situation where this cannot 
be the case, as for example both these markets can be only indirectly linked, by e.g. 
exporting onto a third reference market. This setup can have surprising implications 
for the tests of the LOP. 
 
Let us define three markets with prices xt, yt and zt.  
Also let 1t t ty x∆ = − ; 2t t ty z∆ = − ; 3t t tx z∆ = − . For brevity, we will omit the time 
subscript from most of our further notation. 
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Now let us assume that we observe only the x and y prices, but the ‘true’ reference 
market is the one for which we do not observe the price  (i.e. z). This simply means 
that in a test of the LOP one does not use this price z, although it may be available in 
principle. In this case an econometrician would be interested in testing 1t∆  for unit 
roots. 
Let us further assume that a transaction cost version of the LOP holds with regard to 
the reference market. The question is what would be the implications for the tests of 
the LOP, based on data on the other two markets. 
For simplicity let us further assume with no loss of generality symmetric transaction 
cost bands. 
 Thus  
 
 
 
1 2, 1 2, 1
2 2, 1 2, 1
2 2, 1 2, 1
t t
t t t
t t
p t
t t
p t
− −
− −
− −
 ∆ ∆ >
∆ = ∆ − ≤ ∆ ≤
 ∆ ∆ < −
 (1) 
 
and  
 
 
1 3, 1 3, 1
3 3, 1 3, 1
2 3, 1 3, 1
t t
t t t
t t
q s
s s
q s
− −
− −
− −
 ∆ ∆ >
∆ = ∆ − ≤ ∆ ≤
 ∆ ∆ < −
 (2) 
 
with transaction costs defined by t and s respectively.  
 
Let us denote the three cases for 2t∆  as 1, 2 and 3, and similarly denote the possible 
cases for 3t∆  as A, B, and C. 
 
Under the conditions described above one would test 1 2 3t t t∆ = ∆ − ∆  for stationarity. 
It is clear that 1∆  would be stationary when both 2∆  and 3∆ are stationary, i.e. in 
cases 1A, 1C, 3A and 3C. Similarly when 2∆  is stationary, but 3∆  is not and vice 
versa, i.e. in the cases 2A, 2C,1B and 3B, then 1∆  would be nonstationary. 
 5 
The remaining case is 2B, when both 2∆ and 3∆  contain unit root. 
In this case we can write 
2 2, 1 1 1t t t t t t t ty z u y z u− − −∆ = − = ∆ + = − +  and 
 
3 3, 1 1 1t t t t t t t tx z v x z v− − −∆ = − = ∆ + = − +  
 
from where 
1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1, 1t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t ty z u x z v y x u v u v− − − − − − −∆ = ∆ − ∆ = − + − + − = − + − = ∆ + −  
 
Since both ut and vt are stationary it follows that 1∆ contains unit root. 
 
If we assume that t>s, we can present the above cases graphically. For this illustrative 
purpose without any loss of generality we can fix z.  
 
Stationary cases 
 
Case 1A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this case y and x essentially share the same are above z+t (and x can also be in the 
interval (z+s,z+t)). The difference 1∆ can therefore range from zero to very high 
values.  
Note that case 3C is essentially the same as 1A, only that y and x lie below z. For this 
reason we will not draw any of the type 3 cases. 
 
s 
z 
t 
x 
y 
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Case 1C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Here 1 t s∆ > + . 
Case 3A is similar. 
 
Non-stationary cases 
 
Case 1B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here  1 t s∆ > − . Similar same situation arises in case 3B. 
 
Case 2A. 
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In this case, similarly to the stationary cases 1A and 3C, one cannot determine the 
magnitude of 1∆ , which can take arbitrary (in absolute terms) values. Case 2C is 
similar. 
 
Case 2B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this case 1 t s∆ < + . 
 
Overall although cases 1C, 3A, 1B, 3B seem consistent with a ‘transaction cost’ band 
of t+s, case 2B is somehow out of line, being consistent with an inner ‘transaction 
cost’ band of t-s.  More worryingly however the stationary cases 1A and 3C, as well 
as the non-stationary cases 2A and 2C have nothing to do with a ‘transaction cost’ 
band representation.  Note furthermore that in all the above cases which can to some 
extent fit a ‘transaction cost’ band explanation, y and x are ‘synchronised with regard 
to the ‘unobserved’ z, in the sense that they are both in an inner or outer band, when 
these are defined with regard to the common market price z. 
The general conclusion from the above analysis is that no threshold type of unit roots 
test is appropriate for testing the LOP if the two markets under consideration are not 
directly linked. It does not matter whether these are the conventional threshold unit 
root tests, their generalised smooth transition versions or indeed a non-linear unit root 
tests. The issue is that the stationarity of the price differentials is not function of their 
magnitude. 
What are the general conclusions from this analysis? The LOP can be tested in the 
conventional way, only if the two markets under consideration are directly linked 
through an arbitrage type of relation. If this is not the case one may try to identify the 
appropriate reference markets and test the LOP with regard to the reference market(s).  
s t 
s x 
z 
t y 
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Note that even if one cannot identify in advance the appropriate reference markets, 
formal tests of the LOP can still be carried out. For example in the unit root tests 
setup, we have identified five different regimes for the price differential dynamics. 
One may estimate a general regime-switching model1 for the price differential and 
identify whether the latter fits with the same type of dynamics as identified above. 
One may actually expect to find smaller number of regimes, since for example cases 
1C and 3A may not be very realistic in principle, unless there are considerable 
additional transaction costs between these two markets2. Also some of the identified 
regimes may not be present in particular instance of data used for testing the LOP. 
Note however that the model we use here is still a rather simplified one. For example 
we assume that there is a single reference market, which does not change. One may 
envisage situations where for example both market under consideration have different 
reference markets and only the latter are linked together through a common reference 
market. Furthermore, relaxing the assumption that the reference market does not 
change introduces additional complications. Therefore even the regime switching 
approach suggested above may fall short of properly capturing the underlying price 
dynamics.  
The implications for the PPP tests are much more serious. Since the LOP is a pre-
requisite for the PPP, there does not seem to be any way to circumvent the reference 
market problem in a PPP setting. Even if the extremely restrictive and dubious 
assumption that there is a single reference market for all goods is implemented, the 
resulting pattern of ‘violations’ to the LOP for different goods is so complex that no 
reliable inference about what type of PPP test could be feasible seems possible. 
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Appendix 
 
In a more general setup one may use threshold co-integration, instead of threshold 
unit root tests to account for tastes, preferences and quality differences between the 
concerned markets. 
 
In this case we simply need to redefine 
1t t ty ax∆ = − ; 2t t ty bz∆ = − ; 3t t tx cz∆ = − . With a, b and c taken from the cointegrating 
relationships (ignoring the constants), so that (1) and (2) still hold with regard to the 
so redefined 2∆  and 3∆ , if there are no intercepts. If there are intercepts they will 
modify the thresholds, which does not impact substantially on our argument. For 
example, if 0b  is the intercept for 2∆ , meaning that the co-integration relationship is  
00 t ty bz b= − − , one simply needs to replace t with 0t b+  and –t with 0t b− + . This has 
the effect of shifting the thresholds, so that they are no longer symmetrical. Therefore 
without any loss of generality, unless we want to draw the separate cases, we can 
safely ignore the intercepts. 
Since ( ) ( )2 3a y bz a x cz y ax ac b z∆ − ∆ = − − − = − + −  
We can write 
( )1 2 3a b ac z∆ = ∆ − ∆ + −  (3) 
 
As before we are interested in whether 1∆  contains unit root. 
Lets us firsts consider the case when b=ac. Then the last term in (3) vanishes. It is 
easy to see that then all our previous conclusions hold. The only difference is case 2B, 
which may also turn to be stationary if the variables 2∆  and 3∆  happened to be 
cointegrated with a vector (1, -a). 
If on the other hand b ac≠ , since the last term in (3) is non-stationary, all the 
stationary cases in our previous analysis will now turn non-stationary. The situation 
with the non-stationary cases is slightly more involved, since the relevant expressions 
contain two non-stationary variables.  
Bearing in mind that  
( )2 b ac z y acz∆ + − = −  (4) 
and 
( )3a b ac z bz ax− ∆ + − = −  (5) 
 
If the expression in (4) for example is a local co-integration relationship for case 2 
(and similarly for (5) for case B), the corresponding cases may revert to stationarity. 
Overall however, most cases will be non-stationary. What is important for the 
argument presented here is that similarly to the threshold unit roots, threshold 
cointegration cannot provide valid representation to the LOP in the presence of 
transaction costs, unless the proper reference markets are identified in advance. 
 
 
